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It is easily shown that: (1) If each of P, Q and R is replaced by one symbol for complementation, no two the same, S a: :PPa, S PQa: :QPa and S Pa: :QRa.
(2) (-, &, o) and (-, &, g ) are distinct and complete Boolean algebras. In a forthcoming article this calculus will be presented as an independent system, requiring only two primitive operators.
(ii) in case A is of the sort -B, B is not true on <(, a, R>, (iii) in case A is of the sort B ' C, B is not true on <S. a, R> or C is, (iv) in case A is of the sort (VX)B, the result B(P/X) of putting P for X in B is true on <S. a, R> for every individual parameter P of QM, and (v) in case A is of the sort OB, B is true on <(, a', R> for every member a' of E such that R(a, a').
It can be shown that a wff A of QM is provable in QM if and only if A is true on every triple <S. a, R> of the sort just described. And like results obtain for QS4 (S4 with quantifiers) when R is required to be transitive as well as reflexive, and for QS5 (S5 with quantifiers) when R is required to be transitive and symmetrical as well as reflexive.
It is assumed here that the Barcan formula (provable in QS5) counts as an axiom of QM and QS4. If a strong completeness proof for QM, QS4, and QS5 is to be had, E must be construed as a sequence of indexed functions, and R as a relation on the indices of these assignments.
SuGIAR, ALvIN C. A logical requiem for relativity. This paper is concerned with the greatest scandal in the history of science. The theory of relativity can be shown to be counter factual by an almost childish example. Let me, by way of interjection, refer to a very appropriate legend. Procrustes was a celebrated legendary highwayman of Attica who tied his victims upon an iron bed and, as the case required, either stretched or cut off their legs to adapt them to its length. A Procrustean bed refers therefore to a theory to which facts are arbitrarily adjusted. Relativity is a Procrustean bed. Instead of fitting the theory to the facts, the facts are fitted to the theory. I call for the substantial application of logic and axiomatic procedures to physics. How can the physicists dare to construct theories without the essential and modem tools required for their solid fabrication. The failure of relativity as a physical theory in turn collapses its parent theory, Maxwell's electromagnetism, and this in turn collapses another offspring of electromagnetism, namely, quantum dynamics. To continue with my iconoclastic destruction, let me add that I reject the Michelson-Morley experiment for it was born in bias and enshrined in contradiction. This extensive annihilation of large portions of modem physics creates a vacuum into which we propose to erect my generalized unified field theory developed within the framework of strict axiomatization.
We alter Newton's law of universal gravitation by adding two correction terms. These terms have the effect of accounting for (1) the advance of perihelia in quasi-elliptical orbital motion and (2) atomic repulsion. We formulate a modified Gauss-Bush invariant mass, variant charge foundation of electrodynamics, which unlike Maxwell's electromagnetism is compatible with Newtonian dynamics. We give a more logical formulation of the molecular and the kinetic theories of matter in terms of an explicit quantitative formulation of atomic repulsion. We properly reduce my axiomatic formulation of thermodynamics to the kinetic theory of matter. Of the many objections I have to relativity, I have elected to select the following as a crucial defect and concentrate on it. When the points of light A and B move in opposite directions from a source S, A to the left and B to the right, we must conclude, using the simplest accepted laboratory techniques, that the rate of separation of these points is 2c. This is inviolate-this is fact. For that matter, to deny that this is fact is to deny the validity of any or all empirical procedures and hence the rationality of man. It is sheer insanity, then, for anyone to present us with a theory that contradicts this basic empirical fact, a theory which requires that this velocity be c. SELDIN, JONATHAN P. The paradox of Kleene and Rosser. In their [IFL] , Kleene and Rosser showed that the Richard Paradox can be set up in certain systems of illative combinatory logic, and in his (PKR] Curry studied this paradox in detail for a system with stronger postulates. In this paper it is shown that the paradox can be derived from weaker postulates.
The most important of these postulates can be stated, using the notation of [CLg. North-Holland, probably in 1971) .
[IFL] KLEENE, S. C. and ROSSER, J. B., The inconsistency of certain forinal logics, Annals of Mathematics, (2) vol. 36 (1935), pp. 630-636.
[SIC] SELDIN, J. P., Studies in illative combinatory logic, Dissertation, Amsterdam, 1968. MOSIER, RICHARD D. Recursive functions and the tensor calculus.
A "primitive" recursive function such as Q(x) = x' is read "the function of x is its successor"; but of course we have no way of knowing whether the "successor" in question is x + 1,
What is needed is a way of assigning particular values to the "successors" of the function without impairing the generality of the function. For this purpose, we can use indices of the function, for example,
which indicates that we are dealing with a second-order recursive function in which there are as many "successors" of the function as there are "components" in the corresponding tensor indices.
Thus A'ik is the "successor" of Q(x)ik, which in matrix form displays its "components" in the following way:
The matrix form of A'ik indicates that the "successors" of a recursive function have been transformed into the "components" of a recursive relation. But since the "components" of A'fk have been displayed in matrix form, perhaps, it is also possible to display the "successors" of Q(x)k in matrix form:
Consequently, we note that (substituting l and m for i and k) the relation between Q(x)ik and A'ik can be expressed in the following formulas:
By appropriate transpositions and substitutions, the formulas expressed above can be reduced to:
A'ik = aflak'mQ(x)lm.
We observe in conclusion that the transformation of the "successors" of a recursive function into the "components" of a recursive relation is the logical equivalent of a change of coordinate systems, but the mutual (dialectical) recursiveness of the systems (formulas) permits us to express the evolution of the systems of "successors" and " components" as a recursive equilibration of the process of recursion, that is, as a recursive logic. Mass., 1970] . In connection with these systems a number of interesting questions arise as to the structure of the various general decision problems associated with them. In particular, we have investigated the degree representations of the general word, halting and confluence problems and have effectively shown that every r.e. many-one degree of unsolvability may be represented by each of these. The technique used to achieve this result is to demonstrate an effective procedure which, when applied to an arbitrary Turing machine T, produces a Markov algorithm whose word, halting and confluence problems, are of the same many-one degrees as the derivability, halting and confluence problems for T, respectively. This, combined with the results of Overbeek [see the next abstract], gives us the desired results. Moreover, we have shown this to be best possible in the sense that every r.e. one-one degree of unsolvability may not be represented by any of these general decision problems. Finally, as a direct corollary to this, we have that the class of Markov algorithms is computationally equivalent to the class of total recursive functions, in that every total recursive function is computable by a Markov algorithm which always halts.
OVERBEEK, Ross. Representation of many-one degrees by the word problem for Thue systems. Recent results (C. E. Hughes, Ross Overbeek and W. E. Singletary, Bulletin of the Amerian Mathematical Society, vol. 77 (1971), pp. 467-472.) have shown methods of representing any recursively enumerable many-one degree by either the decision problems (halting, derivability, and confluence) of Turing machines or the word problem for semi-Thue systems. One naturally wonders whether the degree could also be represented by word problems of Thue systems. We have shown the following result.
THEOREM. Given an arbitrary r.e. many-one degree d one can effectively construct a Thue system whose word problem is of degree d. The proof involves the construction of a Turing machine M whose confluence problem is of degree d. A Thue system T is then constructed which simulates the operations of the Turing machine closely enough to allow one to establish that the confluence problem of M and the word problem of T are many-one equivalent.
SmrTH, PERRY. Some special cases of Montague's recursion theory. The standard analytic hierarchy of relations among numbers and infinite sequences is obtained by considering the definability of such relations in the structure with universe W U co and basic relations zero, successor, and function value, using the language of finite type theory with all variables except individual variables ranging over hereditarily finite sets. A second characterization is obtained by using countable sets instead of finite sets.
A recursion theory over the ordinals less than a given infinite cardinal m is obtained, in which the only basic relation is the one holding between an ordinal and the set of all smaller ordinals, and the variables of higher type range over sets hereditarily of power < m. SOLON, T. P. M. Composition and quantification. Virtually all logicians agree that compositional arguments are not formally fallacious. (A) Most writers prefer to list such arguments among the informal fallacies of ambiguity. (B) Some even go so far as to deny that compositional inferences contain any error in reasoning whatsoever.
My own view of the matter is that the advocates of (A) and (B) are mistaken. Consider the following typical example of composition:
Every living thing has a mother. Hence there is some individual which is the mother of every living thing. In terms of quantification this translates into:
This sort of argumentation is obviously formally invalid. Specifically it involves an illicit interchange in the scope of the universal and existential quantifiers. Since all instances of composition exhibit such a structure, they are formally fallacious, and so positions (A) and (B) must be abandoned.
WOODRUFF, PETER W. A new approach to possible objects. The standard approach to possible objects in contemporary modal logic is, in my opinion, open to a number of philosophical objections. We present a new semantics based on the principle that a simple property is "true of" a nonexistent object just in case it is true of that object in all worlds in which the latter exists. This semantics can be shown to be consistent and complete with respect to an appropriate deductive system. An interesting feature of the system is that it provides a fruitful application for three-valued logic. GALLiN, DANIL. Systems of intensional logic.
Montague's system IL (intensional logic) is a synthesis of Church's theory of types with modal logic, capable of treating such troublesome grammatical entities as intensional verbs, adjectives and prepositions. Let e, t, s be distinct entities; the set T of types is the smallest set such that (i) e, t e T; (ii) if a, P e T then <a, A>, <s, a> e T. Terms of type a are characterized as follows: (i) variables or constants of type a (denumerably many) are terms of type a; (ii) if A, B, C, D are terms of types <a, P>, a, a, <s, a> respectively, and v is a variable of type r, then [AB], A v B, [B _ C], 1B, 'D are terms of types P, <y, a>, t, <s, a>, a respectively. A model based on nonempty sets D and I is a system M = <(MW)aeT, m> such that M. = D, Mt = (, 1}, M<a,#> = M,,a, M<sa> = Mal, and m(c)(i) G Ma when c is a constant of type a and i e I. Let J consist of all assignments over M; i.e., functions 4p mapping variables of type a into M,, for all a e T. Given i e I, e e J we define, for each term A of type a, a value Jj,0,(A) e Ma. The clauses are the usual ones, together with: Vj,,0(B)(J) = Vy,,0(B) and Vt,,( D) = V1,0(D)(i). A formula, or term of type t, will always have value 0 or 1, and the notions of semantical consequence, etc., are as usual. The sentential connectives, quantifiers and modal operators can all be defined in IL.
A Henkin-type completeness theorem is proved for IL, using generalized models. Several alternative formulations of higher-order modal logic are described and compared with IL; in one of these systems a natural prenex form theorem obtains.
POWELL, WILLIAM C. An axiomatization of set theory with predication as a relation. We consider another axiomatization of set theory. It is a first-order theory with equality, the membership relation, a new binary relation called prediction, and a constant V. Sets are ABSTRACTS OF PAERS defined to be elements of V. Classes are defined to be collections of sets. The variables P, Q are defined to range over classes. Thus, YPO(P) is short for Vx(Yy(y e x -* y e V) -(x)). Predication is denoted by juxtaposition, and we only consider classes on the left of predication. The axioms are (A) xeye V-+xe V, (B) Vx e V(Px x e P), (C) Vx e V(Px -Qx)-
Vx e J'3QVy(Qy 4-* 4(P; x, y)) where 1 is a formula such that (i) all the free variables are displayed, (ii) the P's are the only variables occurring on the left in predication, (iii) all the P's occur only on the left in predication, and (iv) V does not occur.
Except for regularity, all the axioms of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory are derivable in the theory. Also the existence of indescribable and ineffable cardinals is derivable. If the theory is consistent, then the theory plus V = L is consistent. The consistency of the theory can be established assuming the existence of a 2-valued measurable cardinal. Moreover, the theory can be shown to be consistent from assumptions consistent with V = L. Models of the theory are closely related to Kunen's notion of M-ultrafilter.
OLLMANN, L. TAYLOR. Operators preserving elementary equivalence. Certain operators on relational structures (such as definable homomorphisms, direct unions, reduced products, limit ultrapowers and the generalized products of Feferman and Vaught (Fwndamenta Mathenaieae, vol. 47)) all preserve elementary equivalence. That is to say the first order theories of the structures to which the operator is applied determine the first order theory of the image structure.
A more general class of such operators preserving elementary equivalence is defined and a subclass preserving elementary extensions is isolated.
The technique is to define a topology-like structure on the class of relational structures. The operators are then defined to be those functions of relational structures with certain " continuity" properties. The proof that these operators preserve elementary equivalence uses a game theoretic characterization of elementary equivalence introduced by A. Ehrenfeucht.
Structure theorems are obtained which make the operators relatively easy to construct and work with. They are closed under composition and frequently preserve equivalence with respect to stronger languages. In fact they are readily altered to preserve equivalence in infinity languages.
GmsER, JAMEs R. A formalization of Esenin-Volpin's proof theory with the aid of nonstandard analysis.
In 1959 Esenin-Volpin presented to the Warsaw Symposium on the Foundations of Mathematics a paper sketching a proof of the consistency of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (ZF). Intuitively the idea was that very large sets among the heriditarily finite sets (HF) could be used to instantiate the axiom of infinity, while the other axioms of ZF are modeled in HF as usual. The distinction between small (or feasible) sets and very large sets can be partially formalized in nonstandard analysis using finite sets versus pseudo finite sets. We proceed as follows. A proof theory Tn is developed for the hereditarily finite sets over a set of n urelements along the lines of Fitch including a Carnap's rule: {A(t) I t any closed term} F VxA(x). After extending these constructions to a nonstandard integer no a certain subcollection T9v c Tno is chosen to represent Esenin-Volpin's proof theory. Roughly speaking, a subset of the constant terms is singled out to act as the "feasible" terms. A proof tree T of T"O is in Tcv if only feasible terms occur in the subtree T (of T) in which the Carnap's rule has been restricted to {A(t) I t feasible} F VxA(x). (Note that terms may arise in the course of proving existential sentences in T). By means of these ideas a nonclassical proof theory FW is developed. kg is shown to be consistent and closed under modus ponens as well as other derived rules, e.g. F-y A V B k -g A or kg B, For 3xA(x) kg FA(t), t feasible, For nnA--A A. The law of the excluded middle fails in general. There are also F9-proofs of the axioms of Pairing, Infinite Union, Powerset, Infinity and forms of Comprehension and Replacement. All El true sentences of arithmetic are kg provable while there are i4 kgr-undecidable sentences.
GRANTr, JOHN. Recognizable algebras of fornaulas. L is a first-order.language with equality and Lu is the diagram language for the structure 21.
Let r be a set of formulas of Lu. Then r is called a recognizable set of formulas if: (1) the free variables in each ' e r are identical, (2) there is a test formula, T('p), of L such that for a formula p (with the proper free variables)
'p e r iff 1 T('p).
Consider such a r as the domain of an algebra Ai. If l _ 3 iff each pair of corresponding recognizable algebras are equationally equivalent. The theorem and the corollary can be extended to La.
Let A be an algebra and B a congruence relation on A. B is called a recognizable congruence relation if it is defined by a formula T(x, y) of L.
THEOREM. A _ B ifffor every recognizable congruence relation B, A/B B/B.
This theorem can be extended to Lass PARSONS, CHARLES. On a number-theoretic choice schema. II.
As in [11, let Zo be elementary number theory with all elementary functions and only quantifier-free induction. We consider the results of adding axiom schemata or rules to Z0. Let FAC be the schema Vx < a3yAxy D 3cVx < aA(x, cc) (c ranges over sequence numbers). Let IR and IA be the rule and axiom schema of induction respectively. For any schema S, let S,2(Sn') be S restricted to En(Hln) RREnENS.
[1] C. PARSONS, Ona number-theoretic choice schema and its relation to induction. A Kino, J. Myhill, and R. E. Vesley (eds.), Inhtahionism and proof theory, Amsterdam, 1970, pp. 459-473. [2] , On n-quantifier induction (to appear in this JOURNAL).
SMORYNSKI, C. The undecidability of some intuitionistic theories of equality and order. Let Tbe an intuitionistic theory and let M1 be the intuitionistic monadic predicate calculus on one predicate letter. For each formula A of M1, define A to be valid in Tiff A' is a theorem of T for every instance, A' of A in the language of T.
The (obvious) completeness problem is to prove: A is a theorem of M1 iff A is valid in T. Since the provability of A implies its validity, the problem is reduced to proving: If A is not a theorem of M1, then some instance, A', of A is not a theorem of T. The natural effective completeness problem is thus: For each formula A of M1, an instance, A', of A must be effectively found, such that, if A is not a theorem of M1, then A' is not a theorem of T.
By the undecidability of M1 (Maslov, Mints, and Orevkov), an effective completeness theorem will yield the hereditary undecidability of the theory T-hereditary, since the completeness theorem holds for all subtheories of T.
Effective completeness theorems are obtained for several intuitionistic theories of equality and order, including:
(1) The theories of equality and normal equality on infinite domains. This is a minor improvement on Lifshits.
(2) The theory of an apartness relation, as described in Heyting, p. 49. (This result was obtained jointly by R. Statman and myself.) (3) The induction-free theory of successor, given by the axioms:
(The addition of induction or, equivalently, a decidable equality yields a decidable theory, as shown by Lopez-Escobar.) (4) The theory of dense linear order, obtained by adding the following to Scott's axioms for linear order (I, p. 195): 3y(x < y), 3y(y < x), 3z(x < y =~ x < z < y).
It follows that Scott's theory of linear order is undecidable. This settles his question (II, p. 237).
REFERENCES. HEYTING, AREND, Intuitionism, An introduction 2nd ed., North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1966. LIFSHITS, V. A., Problem of decidability for some constructive theories of equalities, Sudies in constructive mathematics and mathematical logic, Part I, Consultants Bureau, New York, 1969.
LOPEz-EsCOBAR, E. G. K., A decision method for the intuitionistic theory of successor, In. dagationes Mathematicae, vol. 30 (1968) , pp. 466-467.
MASLOV, S. Yu., MirNS, G. E., and OREVKOV, V. P., Unsolvability in the constructive predicate calculus of certain classes of formulas containing only monadic predicate variables, Soviet Math-Doklady, vol. 163 (1965) By formalizing Kleene's notion r j A and the argument of Disjunction and existence under implication in elementary intuitionistic formalisms, this JOURNAL, vol. 27 (1962) , pp. 11-18, an extension is obtained of the results in that paper to formulas of the form A -+ B V C and A -) 3xB(x) with free variables. For each pair of formulas E, A of Heyting's arithmetic a formula E I A is defined with exactly the free variables occurring in E or A. It is then provable that, if F E -* A, then E I E F E I A. As a corollary it follows that, if F C -) 3xA(x), with x not free in C, then C I C F 3x(C -) A(x)) and, for example, since always FI 'C I 'C, if F 'C -* 3xA(x), then F 3x('C -o Ax). In fact, it can be shown that, whenever C fulfills Harrop's condition (Concerning formulas of the types A -+ B V C, A -p (Ex)B(x) in intuitionistic formal systems, this JOURNAL, vol. 25 (1960) , pp. 27-32) of not containing "'relevant" occurrences of V and 3, then, if F C --3xA(x), also F 3x(C -+ Ax).
By means of a second slightly more complicated formalization a constructive proof is obtained of the following assertion.
If f(B) is a propositional formula with only the propositional variable B and f (B) is not provable in the intuitionistic propositional calculus, and, if furthermore A is a closed formula of Heyting's arithmetic, then FSf(A) implies F "A or F "A -* A. ScHorr, HERMANN F. Subject and predicate calculi. A universe of discourse is considered in which atomic sentences have the form fJal. (Object language symbols with numerical subscripts are designated by syntactical symbols of the same form but with literal or no subscripts. Logical symbols including concatenation are used autonomously.) The at are elementary subjects designating things; the A are elementary predicates designating attributes. The variables gi and bi range over attributes and things, respectively. Symbols of the forms at and xi are used respectively for classes and bundles.
The class calculus arises from the axioms and rules of the propositional calculus (PC) together with those of the predicate calculus and the following definitional axioms: (Cl) .a)AbPa/bP,
.a ef fa, (C3) ai a a, = Vb.b e at: b e aj,
.at = a, 3*aa C a, & a c aj,
na Ab-bea.
The bundle calculus is developed from the axioms and rules of PC and-subject analogues of those of the predicate calculus plus the following:
.f9 a afa,
.xi F X1 3 g-g 9 xi = g 3 xi,
.
Xif xj
Gg.g3 -x&g3xi,
A logic embodying both calculi requires additional axioms incorporating scope requirements: (Ml) .a 9 x -x/b b e a, (M2) .x e a a/gg a x, which have useful corollaries: .a 3 a = a e a and .x ef _ f3 x. A natural language interpretation, in which scope is indicated by commas, has application in the analysis of zeugmas.
The logic can be extended to include an individual calculus of things such as that of Leonard and Goodman and its mirror image a taxonomic calculus of attributes. The calculus of Goodman's Structure of Appearance can be subsumed into the bundle calculus.
The development of second order predicate (subject) calculi requires the introduction of class (bundle) variables with quantification ranging over classes (bundles) in general.
MosTowsKi, ANDRZEJ. A transfinite sequence of c-models.
Denote by A2 the system of 2nd order arithmetic as described in Mostowski-Suzuki, Fundamenta Mathematicae, vol. 65 (1969), pp. 83-93 . r-models of this sytem will be identified with the families of their sets. We denote by Mp, the "principal" model containing all sets of integers and by F the family of all denumerable "-models which are elementarily equivalent to Ml,. A set C of integers is called a code of a denumerable family M of sets of integers if M coincides with the family of sets C. = {m: 2n(2m -1) e C}, n = 1, 2,* --. We say that MeN if N contains a code of M.
Using methods similar to those of the quoted paper one shows the following THEOREM. There exists a family F, a F with the properties: (i) If M, N e F, then either M < N and M e N or N < M and N e M; (ii) the order type of the relation -< in F is i) where il is the type of rational numbers. COROLLARY 1. There is a set of sets of integers which is ordered in type iq by the relation " to be Jyperarithmetical in".
COROLLARY 2. There is a family F2 C F which is ordered in type X. w by the relation e. We say that an w-model M has property (P) if for every set X in M there is an c-model N such that XeN< Mand Ne M. COROLLARY 3. For every set X of integers there exists an ca-model M in F such that X e M and M has property (P). SCHUMM, GEORGE F. Trees, bouquets, and extensions of S4.
We consider extensions of S4 by the axioms: A.
( Pn D (q =' 0q) ... DA Em. 00 V 1: i< J!C2 +:L Dh(Pt = PJ)9 proving each such system decidable and to be complete relative to an appropriate relational modelling. Of these systems, S4B, S4BD1, and S4AC1 are equivalent to Sobocin'ski's K1.1, K1.2, and Zeman's S4.04, respectively.
A relational model 21 = <W, R> is called a bouquet if W = Xu UX GQw7X With ,X n X{x} and R the smallest reflexive and transitive relation on W such that 23 = <X, R r X> is a finite tree and R is universal on WX for each x in Q, the set of endpoints of 2. WX is a blossom of 21 and the elements of W. are its petals. We say that Z is an n-bouquet if every branch of 23 is of order type ?n + 1.
THEOREM. S4A (S4ACn, S4AEm, S4ACnEml, S4B, S4BDn) is determined by the class of finite bouquets (n-bouquets, bouquets whose every blossom contains at most m petals, n-bouquets whose every blossom contains at most m petals, trees, trees whose every branch is of order type <n + 1). COROLLARY. S4A = l1 i <C 0S4ACl, S4ACn = f1: F .,,S4AC.E,. S4AEm, = l < <S4ACi Em, and S4B = nl i <wS4BDi.
SCHUMM, GEORGE F. Finite limitations on some extensions of T.
The Feys-von Wright system T is known to be determined by the class of finite reflexive relational models, while the class of finite reflexive and symmetric models determines its Brouwersche extension B. Letting T, and B, be the results of enriching T and B, respectively, with the Dugundji axiom V 0(PPi)
Is f < 1. 2n + 1 we show that Tn(Bn) is a proper extension of Tn+l(Bn+l) and THEOREM. Tn(Bn) is determined by the class of finite reflexive (reflexive and symmetric) relational models < W, R> such that for each w e W there are at most n elements x of Wfor which wRx.
COROLLARY. T = n St <,Ti andB = nli s < wBi.
Suppose S is any one of the following extensions of T: S4, S4.2, S4.3, S5, Sobocinski's S4.1, S4.4, K1, K2, K3, K1.1, K2.1, K3.1, K1.2, K3.2, Prior's D, and Zeman's S4.3.2, S4.04. Then if S is extended with the Dugundji axiom, Sn is a proper extension of Sn,+1 and THEOREM. For each S there is a class C offinite relational models such that C determines S and Sn is determined by the class of n-element models in C.
COROLLARY. S = nfi<,,,,S,.
This generalizes an analogous result originally obtained for S5 by Scroggs (this JOURNAL, vol. 16, using the 2n-valued Henle matrices, and enables us to axiomatize several manyvalued matrices which have appeared in the literature. The K3.1n's axiomatize the 2n-valued matrices mentioned by Prior on pp. 15-16 of Time and modality, Oxford, 1957, while K1.23 and K3.23 axiomatize eight-valued matrices constructed by Prior (Notre Dame journal of formal logic, vol. 5, p. 299) and Zeman (ibid., vol. 9, p. 297) . S42 axiomatizes a sixteen-valued matrix due to Sobocin'ski (ibid., vol. 11, p. 350, matrix 10) and is deductively equivalent to his system VI. SEGERBERG, KRISTER. On the extensions of S4.4.
We use the terminology of [2] . For definitions of the modal logics mentioned below, see [1] and [4] . We assume the identifications n = {0, 1, * * *, n -1} and t = {0, 1, * * *}. An index (of length 2) is an ordered couple (t1, t2) such that t1, t2 c co. Every index induces a frame <U.,R>, namely that for which U = {(m,na): m = 0 &n < t1, or m = 1 &n < t2} and (in, n)R(m', n') iff m < in'. A logic is said to have index (at, t2) if it is determined by the frame induced by (t1, t2). A logic is an index logic if it has an index. It is clear that S5 has index w. WEBB, PHILIP. A pair ofprimitive rules for the sentential calculus.
The system: /I P /E p I q/r q P r Fq F r/q I p r is easily shown complete. The sytem can be proved unique (with minor variants) using a tautology A, containing C**, C'** s.t. if A' is constructed from A by replacing C**, C'** by B, B' where -(B < B')A' is not tautologous; C**, C'** are constructed from C'*, C"t as Cl, C" are from Ct, C'h, and Ct*, C"t lie within > xis in C**, C'**; C't e '(Ct) if i is odd or E(Ct) if i is even, and C'* is similar but reversing 'odd' and 'even', and C', C" lie within >xis in Ct*, C't*; C' = C..-..* /Cnv (Cr' is a variable; n -1 > x; group to right) or is got from it by replacing 1 or more Cvi by C1 E Z(C)4) if 3 is even or Z'(C'1') if 3 is odd, and C" is similar but reversing 'odd' and 'even'; E(E) is the sequence consisting of E and all WFFs got by writing E/G I EIH for E in an earlier member, and E'(E) is similar but writing E/E I G (so if J e 1(E)J < E, and if J e Z'(E)E < J); and A satisfies other minor conditions. It can be shown that for almost any other pair of natural-deductive rules where no variable lies within > xis, A is not derivable. For the rules must allow the reduction by 2 at a time of the number of /s within which Cot lies till it lies within 0/s. So there must be a rule of detachment, with one premiss and one line of its conclusion a single variable; whence it is easy to show the rules must resemble almost exactly those above.
WHERRrIr, DR. ROBERT C. First-order equality logic with weak existence assumptions.
We formulate and prove completeness theorems for several classes of first-order logics with equality and function symbols (including individual constants as 0-ary function symbols) whose existence assumptions diminish in strength from the standard ones (3x(x = t) is provable for any term t) to the weakest ones (no existential formulas are provable). The semantics is based on a generalization of Tarski's notion of an interpretation called a semirealization in which there is a nonvoid universe S, a domain D C S, and a semantimorphism a which associates semantic objects with syntactical objects so that: (i) for each n-ary predicate letter P, c. a CS (ii) for each n-ary function letter, of is a partial function from SI to S, (iii) there is a nonvoid set R with D c R a S such that free variables range over R while bound variables are restricted to range within D, (iv) a restricted to formulas is a two-valued homomorphism with respect to the logical functors. A semirealization Q is strong if D = R, and Q is called a full realization if D = S and each af is a total function. THEOREM 1. The standard propositional rules and axioms, the rule VIntro, the quantifier rules F Vy(VxA : A(y/x)) and Vx(A -B) F VxA = VxB, and the standard equality rules are all valid in every semirealization. Conversely, every formula true in all semirealizations is provable by the rules given above. THEOREM 2. Besides the rules and axioms above, VxA F A(y/x) is valid in the class of all strong realizations. Conversely, every formula true in this class is provable from the rules and axioms given above. THEOREM 3. Besides the rules and axioms above, the rule VElim VxA F A(t/x) for every term t is valid in the class of all full realizations. Conversely, any formula true in this class is provable from the rules and axioms given above.
